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Abstract. We discuss some applications of 3-manifold topology to cryp-
tography. In particular, we propose a public-key and a symmetric-key
cryptographic scheme based on the Thurston norm on the first cohomol-
ogy of hyperbolic manifolds.
1 Introduction
Geometric group theory and low dimensional topology have developed many
powerful tools for studying groups, and many group theoretic ideas have been
productive in group-based cryptography. Here, we propose importing ideas from
hyperbolic geometry to build new cryptoschemes with certain security advan-
tages.
Specifically, we consider the Thurston norm on H1(M,R), the first cohomol-
ogy of a finite volume hyperbolic 3–manifold, as introduced in [33]. The Thurston
norm measures the Euler characteristic of the simplest surface inM which repre-
sents a second homology class which is Poincare´ dual to an integral cohomology
class, and extends it to the entirety of H1(M,R). The Thurston norm has a
remarkable linear nature which makes computations with it tractable, and as
outlined below, organizes the fibrations of a fibered hyperbolic 3–manifold.
We will use the Thurston norm to build a new symmetric-key cryptographic
scheme. Combined with a certain group based public key exchange, we obtain
a public-key cryptoscheme which has two levels of security and in which all
communications are over public channels.
National Security Agency (NSA) announced plans to upgrade current secu-
rity standards in 2015; the goal is to replace all deployed cryptographic protocols
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with quantum secure protocols, due to the increasing possibility of quantum at-
tacks. This transition requires a new, post-quantum, security standard to be
accepted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Pro-
posals for quantum secure cryptosystems and protocols have been submitted
for the standardization process. There are six main primitives currently pro-
posed to be quantum-safe: (1) lattice-based (2) code-based (3) isogeny-based (4)
multivariate-based (5) hash-based, and (6) group-based cryptographic schemes.
Applications to post-quantum group-based cryptography could be shown if the
underlying security problem is NP-complete or unsolvable; ideally one could
analyze the relationship of the problems under consideration here to the hid-
den subgroup problem (HSP), then analyze Grover’s search problem. As for the
relationship to the HSP, the groups under consideration are infinite and so a
practical way to process them needs to be developed.
In [21], a practical cryptanalysis of WalnutDSA was proposed, a platform
which was given in 2016 in [3] as a post-quantum cryptosystem using braid
groups and conjugacy search problem, submitted to NIST competition in 2017.
There are other group-theoretic problems and classes of groups which have
been proposed for post-quantum group-based cryptography, as we summarize
here. The pioneers in this field were Wagner-Magyarik, who in [35] used a right-
angled Artin group as a platform, relying on the word problem and the word
choice problem; this approach was later improved by Levy-Perret in [26]. At the
same time, Birget-Magliveras-Sramka [7] proposed a new protocol based on dif-
ferent groups that share some properties with Higman-Thompson groups. Later
on, right-angled Artin groups were proposed by Flores-Kahrobaei and Flores-
Kahrobaei-Koberda as a platform for various cryptographic protocols [16,17].
Eick and Kahrobaei proposed polycyclic groups as a platform, using the conju-
gacy search problem as a basis for security [15]. Gryak-Kahrobaei proposed other
group-theoretic problems for consideration for polycyclic group platforms [18].
Kahrobaei-Koupparis [23] proposed a post-quantum digital signature using poly-
cyclic groups. Kahrobaei-Khan [22] proposed a public-key cryptosystem using
polycyclic groups [22]. Habeeb-Kahrobaei-Koupparis-Shpilrain proposed pub-
lic key exchanges using semidirect products of semigroups in [19]. Thompson’s
groups have been considered by Shpilrain-Ushakov, with cryptoschemes based on
the decomposition search problem [31]. Hyperbolic groups have been proposed
by Chatterji-Kahrobaei-Lu, relying on properties of subgroup distortion and the
geodesic length problem [12]. Cavallo-Habeeb-Kahrobaei-Shpilrain proposed us-
ing small cancellation groups for secret sharing scheme [10,20]. Free metabelian
groups have been proposed as a platform by Shpilrain-Zapata, with the scheme
based on the subgroup membership search problem [32]. Kahrobaei-Shpilrain
proposed free nilpotent p-groups as a platform for a semidirect product pub-
lic key [25]. Linear groups were proposed by Baumslag-Fine-Xu [6], and Grig-
orchuk’s group have been proposed in [29]. Finally in [24], Arithmetic groups
were proposed as platform for a symmetric-key cryptographic scheme.
2 Hyperbolic 3–manifolds and the Thurston norm
We review some well–known background about hyperbolic 3–manifolds and the
Thurston norm [33], concentrating on the case of fibered hyperbolic 3–manifolds.
2.1 Generalities about the Thurston norm
Let M = Mψ be a fibered hyperbolic 3–manifold. That is to say, there is an
orientable surface S with negative Euler characteristic and a mapping class
ψ ∈ Mod(S) such that M is the mapping torus of ψ. Observe that the rank
of H1(M,R) is at least one, since π1(M) surjects to Z. Integral cohomology
classes of M which correspond to fibrations of M are called fibered cohomology
classes of M .
A fibered 3–manifold M is called atoroidal if it does not contain a non-
peripheral incompresible torus. Here, this means that if T ⊂M is a π1-injective
copy of the torus, then T can be pushed into a cusp of M . It is a famous result
of Thurston that a fibered 3–manifold admits a finite volume hyperbolic metric
if and only if it is atoroidal, which in turn will happen if and only if no power
of the mapping class ψ fixes the homotopy class of a simple closed loop on S.
Here, a simple closed loop on S is an essential copy of S1 which is not parallel
to a puncture or boundary component of S. Such a mapping class ψ is called
pseudo-Anosov.
It is a standard result from foliation theory that if the rank of H1(M,R) is
at least two, then small perturbations of φ will give new fibrations ofM over the
circle which are inequivalent to φ. Thurston’s work [33] organized the fibrations
of M by defining a norm || · ||T on H
1(M,R), called the Thurston norm. The
norm of a cohomology class ||φ||T is given by minSφ |χ(Sφ)|, where this minimum
is taken over surfaces which are Poincare´ dual to φ. The following summarizes
the relevant features of the Thurston norm:
Theorem 1. Let M be a compact atoroidal 3–manifold with χ(M) = 0, and let
|| · ||T be the Thurston norm.
1. || · ||T is a nondegenerate norm on the vector space H
1(M,R);
2. The unit norm ball is a convex polytope, all of whose vertices lie at rational
points in H1(M,R);
3. Let φ ∈ H1(M,Z) be a fibered cohomology class of M . Then there is a
maximum dimensional face F of the unit ball of || · ||T such that φ ∈ R · F .
Moreover, every primitive integral cohomology class φ ∈ R ·F is fibered. The
face F is called a fibered face of the unit norm ball.
Here, an integral cohomology class if called primitive if it is nonzero and if it is
not an integer multiple of another integral cohomology class. Viewed as a tuple
of vectors, an integral cohomology class is primitive if and only if the entries of
the tuple are relatively prime and not all zero.
Let ψ ∈ H1(M,Z) be a fibered cohomology class. Then M fibers over the
circle with fiber S = Sψ, where π1(S) < π1(M) is identified with kerψ. The
following proposition is standard and we include its proof for the convenience of
the reader.
Proposition 1. Suppose M is hyperbolic, and let S be the fiber of a fibration of
M over S1. Then π1(S) < π1(M) is exponentially distorted, and the membership
problem for π1(S) is solvable in linear time.
Proof. We have that π1(M) is a semidirect product of Z with π1(S), where the
conjugation action of a generator t of Z is given by a pseudo-Anosov mapping
class of π1(S). If 1 6= γ ∈ π1(S) and ψ is a pseudo-Anosov mapping class which
has been lifted to an automorphism of π1(S), then the length of the shortest
representative in the conjugacy class of ψn(γ) grows like λnψ , where λψ > 1 is a
real number called the stretch factor of ψ. Since conjugation by t acts on π1(S)
by ψ, we have that ψn(γ) = t−nγtn, a word whose length is linear in n. It follows
that π1(S) < π1(M) is exponentially distorted.
Now suppose that g ∈ π1(M) is a given element, and we wish to determine if
g ∈ π1(S). The group π1(M) surjects to Z by a homomorphism φ, and the kernel
of this map is exactly π1(S). If π1(M) = 〈g1, . . . , gk〉, then φ is determined by
its values on the generators of π1(M). If g ∈ π1(M) is a product of N generators
of π1(M), we compute the value of φ on the N generators needed to represent g
and add them up, which requires computational resources bounded by a linear
function in N . If the resulting sum is zero, then g ∈ π1(S). If the sum is nonzero
then g /∈ π1(S).
2.2 Examples
From the general description, the Thurston norm seems very difficult to compute
and hence unwieldy for many practical applications. However, there are many
situations in which the Thurston norm can be computed, at least in a cone over
a fibered face.
In [28], McMullen defined the Teichmu¨ller polynomial associated to a fibered
face and gave a practically implementable algorithm for computing it. From the
Teichmu¨ller norm (computed from the Teichmu¨ller polynomial) and the Alexan-
der norm (computed from the Alexander polynomial) on H1(M,R) for a fibered
hyperbolic 3–manifold M , one can compute a fibered face of the unit Thurston
norm ball, the cone over which contains the given fibered cohomology class. He
indicates how to carry out these computations for certain pseudo-Anosov braids
of the 4–times punctured sphere.
A very detailed computation of the Alexander and Teichmu¨ller norm for a
particular two–cusped hyperbolic 3–manifold, namely the sibling of the White-
head link complement, was carried out by Aaber–Dunfield [1]. The authors of
that paper explicitly computed the Alexander and Teichmu¨ller polynomials of
the sibling of the Whitehead link complement, as well as the whole Thurston
norm ball, which is a square with unit side length centered at the origin. They
show that all four faces of the square are fibered, and so that every primitive
cohomology class of the manifold is fibered except the ones lying on the two lines
passing through the corners of the square.
3 An application to public-key cryptography
We now propose a cryptographic scheme which uses the Thurston norm. Alice
and Bob are communicating over an insecure channel. The following information
is public:
– A fibered hyperbolic 3–manifold M with H1(M,R) of rank at least two, a
fixed finite presentation of π1(M), and a fibered face F of the Thurston norm
ball. For instance, one could use Thurston’s example of the simplest pseudo-
Anosov braid, or alternatively Aaber–Dunfield’s example, as described above.
– For every primitive integral cohomology class φ ∈ R+ ·F , a standard presen-
tation Pφ of the corresponding fiber group π1(Sφ), a stable letter tφ ∈ π1(M),
and an automorphism ψφ of π1(Sφ) such that π1(M) is the semidirect prod-
uct of π1(Sφ) with Z with the conjugation action of tφ given by ψφ. An
explicit isomorphism between π1(M) with its fixed presentation and this
semidirect product presentation corresponding to the fibered class φ is in-
cluded in the data. We write Prim(R+ ·F ) for the collection of such primitive
integral cohomology classes. Here, the choice of the stable letter is not strictly
necessary, but it precludes the need for an extra conjugacy decision later on
in the cryptoscheme.
– A finitely generated group G suitable for a public-key cryptographic scheme
such as the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld protocol (see [2]) and an efficiently com-
putable function
f : G→ Prim(R+ · F ).
Here, a standard presentation for a fiber group is either a presentation of
a free group with finitely many generators and no relations, or the standard
presentation of a closed surface group of genus g:
π1(Sg) = 〈a1, b1, . . . , ag, bg | [a1, b1] · · · [ag, bg] = 1〉.
The scheme is as follows:
1. Alice and Bob use a public-key cryptographic scheme in order to produce a
shared private key g ∈ G.
2. Using the public function f , Alice and Bob agree on the fibered cohomology
class φ = f(g) with corresponding fiber group π1(S) with presentation P
and automorphism ψ.
3. Alice chooses an arbitrary positive integer N and computes the length of
ψN (s) for every generator of π1(S) in the presentation P . The key is the
maximum length ℓmax obtained in this way, on the generator smax in P .
4. Over a public channel, Alice sends a finite collection {x1, . . . , xt} ⊂ π1(M),
written in terms of the fixed generators for π1(M), and of length comparable
to N . She chooses these elements in such a way that if Xφ is the generating
set in the presentation Pφ, then ψ
N (Xφ) ⊂ {x1, . . . , xt}, but so that most
of the elements in {x1, . . . , xt} do not belong to π1(S).
5. Bob checks which of these elements lie in π1(S).
6. Bob uses the fact that ψ is given by conjugation by an element of π1(M) to
recover N .
7. Bob computes the length of ψN (s) for each generator of π1(S) and recovers
ℓmax.
We remark that the value of ℓmax is uniquely determined by Alice’s initial
choice of N .
4 An explicit example
We consider the example of a fibered 3-manifold coming from the simplest
pseudo-Anosov braid, as worked out in [28].
4.1 The 3-manifold
The initial fiber is S0, which is identified with the thrice punctured disk, and
whose mapping class group is identified with the three–stranded braid group B3.
In the standard braid generating set {σ1, σ2}, the simplest pseudo-Anosov braid
is given by β = σ1σ
−1
2 .
We have that π1(S0) = 〈x, y, z〉 ∼= F3, where these generators are identified
with small based loops about the three punctures of S0. We have
σ1 : (x, y, z) | (y, y
−1xy, z)
and
σ−12 : (x, y, z) 7→ (x, yzy
−1, y).
Thus, we have
β : (x, y, z) 7→ (yzy−1, yz−1y−1xyzy−1, y).
A presentation for the fundamental group of the fibered 3-manifold associated
to β can be written as
π1(M) = 〈t, x, y, z | t
−1xt = yzy−1, t−1yt = yz−1y−1xyzy−1, t−1zt = y〉.
It is easy to see that β acts transitively on the punctures of S0, and so that
H1(M,Z) ∼= Z
2. If φ ∈ H1(M,Z), then φ is determined by its values on t and on
x, so that we may write φ = (a, b) ∈ Z2 for the cohomology class which satisfies
φ(t) = a and φ(x) = b. McMullen computes the Thurston norm on H1(M,R)
and shows that it is given by
||φ||T = max{|2a|, |2b|}.
Each face of the Thurston unit norm ball is fibered. The face F whose cone
contains (1, 0) is therefore given by F = {1/2} × [−1/2, 1/2].
4.2 From a public key to a new fibration
Let G be a finitely generated group suitable for the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld
protocol, with a fixed normal form. Then we can construct a computable function
which associates to elements of G various fibrations of M . If g ∈ G, we write g
in a normal form and let |g| denote the length of g in this normal form. Then,
we may set
f(g) = D(g)
(
{1/2},
{
|g|
|g|+ 1
− 1/2
})
,
where here D(g) is chosen to be the smallest positive integer so that f(g) ∈ Z2.
Note that D(g) ≤ lcm{2, |g| + 1}. Thus, we have associated to g ∈ G a new
cohomology class f(g) which is defined by
f(g)(t) = D(g)/2
and
f(g)(x) = |g| ·D(g)/(|g|+ 1)−D(g)/2.
This cohomology class will represent a new fibration provided |g| 6= 0. We remark
that the function f constructed here is just one possible example which would
suit our purposes. There are many other suitable candidates for f .
4.3 New fiber subgroups
Given φ ∈ H1(M,Z2). We have that the new fiber subgroup π1(Sφ) is given by
the kernel of φ, viewed as the composition
π1(M)→ H1(M,Z)→ Z,
where the first map is the abelianization map and where the second map is φ.
The group π1(Sφ) will always be a finite rank free group, and its rank can be
computed as ||φ||T +1, since ||φ||T denotes the absolute value of the Euler char-
acteristic of the fiber. Finding a presentation for the fiber subgroup is sometimes
possible [9,14], though in general it may be difficult. This is why we assume that
free presentations for fiber subgroups are part of the public data.
4.4 Distortion of lengths
The advantage of the scheme we propose is that a very large integer is encoded
by a relatively small one. Alice picks N , and her key is the maximal length
of ψNφ applied to elements of the free generating set of the fiber subgroup. To
communicate N over the channel, she applies ψNφ , viewed as conjugation by the
element of tφ ∈ π1(M). The resulting elements of π1(M) will have lengths which
are linear in N . When Alice sends information over the channel, Bob applies tφ
successively to generators of π1(Sφ) and checks to see if the generating set lies in
{x1, . . . , xt}. This will require linearly many calculations in N and t, since the
word problem in hyperbolic 3-manifold groups has linear complexity. Once Bob
finds the first such N , this will be the same value of N as chosen by Alice, since
ψφ is pseudo-Anosov and is therefore not periodic.
The key that Alice and Bob wish to share is instead ℓmax, which is the
maximal length of ψNφ applied to a generator of π1(Sφ), viewed as an element
of π1(Sφ). Alice and Bob now both know N , and thus can recover ℓmax, since
ψφ is a public automorphism of the free group π1(Sφ). The size of ℓmax will be
exponential in N . The precise distortion can be computed from the Teichmu¨ller
polynomial. McMullen computes the Teichmu¨ller polynomial for that fibered
face to be
Θ(t, u) = 1− t(1 + u+ u−1) + t2.
Here, the polynomial Θ(t, u) is viewed as an element of the group ring Z[H, t±1],
where here H = 〈u〉 denotes the ψφ–invariant homology of Sφ. In this case, the
generator t can be identified with the stable letter t of the fibration defining
M , and we can write the other generator as u = [x] + [y] + [z], the sum of the
homology classes of the three punctures. Then, we can write
Θ(t, u) =
∑
g∈H1(M,Z)
agg,
with ag ∈ Z. If φ ∈ H
1(M,Z), then we view φ as an element of Hom(π1(M),Z)
and and we can write
Θ(k) =
∑
g∈H1(M,Z)
agk
φ(g).
We set λφ to be the largest root of Θ(k), which will always be a real number
which is greater than one. Then we have ℓmax ∼ λ
N
φ .
5 An application to symmetric-key cryptography
The scheme developed in Sections 3 and 4 can be simplified somewhat to yield
a symmetric-key cryptographic scheme. Such a scheme would eschew the need
for an initial private shared key. The setup for this scheme would be as follows.
Public information: The fibered hyperbolic manifold M , presented as a
mapping torus, would be public as before. A presentation for π1(M) would also
be public.
Private information: Alice and Bob would agree beforehand on a fibered
cohomology class φ of M . This would yield a private fibered subgroup π1(Sφ)
with a preferred presentation, and a private automorphism ψφ of π1(Sφ).
The implementation of the cryptoscheme would be as follows:
1. Alice chooses an arbitrary integer N .
2. Alice communicates the integer N to Bob over a public channel.
3. Alice and Bob both compute ψNφ on the generators of π1(Sφ) in the preferred
presentation, and compute the lengths of the resulting words.
4. The shared key is ℓmax, the longest length of a word obtained by applying
ψNφ to the generators.
6 Remarks on security
There are several layers of security which are built into the schemes we propose.
In the public-key scheme, the first layer of security lies in similar security assump-
tions of the public key-exchange scheme a` la Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld (AAG).
We recall that this is used by Alice and Bob to agree on a fibered cohomology
class. We note that there have been several proposals for the platform group for
the AAG protocol, such as braid groups, polycyclic groups, Grigorchuk groups,
certain classes of right-angled Artin groups and their subgroups, in which the
simultaneous conjugacy search problem is difficult. Apart from a few proposed
attacks (see [34,30] for attacks adapted to braid group and linear group plat-
forms as well as potential ripostes), the AAG scheme remains secure for suitable
choices of parameters. In the symmetric-key scheme, the use of AAG is unnec-
essary, thus removing any vulnerabilities to attacks on that protocol.
In both schemes, the key that Alice and Bob share will be much larger than
any of the public data over the channel. Thus, even if the eavesdropper is able
to guess N , the key ℓmax is exponentially longer than N and would therefore
be much more difficult to guess, short of knowing which cohomology class Alice
and Bob are using.
For Alice and Bob, computations inside the group π1(S) are easy since this
group is either free or a surface group, and hence computing word lengths and
solving the word problem is relatively easy (using small cancellation theory, for
instance) from the standard presentations given in the public data.
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